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Who should go first in phase-I human trials when neither risks nor benefits can be estimated? By assessing
concerns raised by Bretzner et al. (2011), we highlight a tragic dimension underlying all such trials. We
discuss strategies to avoid the pitfalls of ethical hubris by promoting fidelity and trust.There is a profound moral question at the
heart of all translational research: Who
should go first in human trials when the
risks are not possible to estimate, the trial
highly observed, and the effects of failure
far-reaching? This paper aims at address-
ing this question by unveiling the episte-
mological problem at its core. To this
end, we will begin by considering a set
of claims put forward in Bretzner et al.
(2011)’s ethical assessment (Bretzner
et al., 2011) of the first FDA-approved
clinical trial that applies cells derived
from human embryonic stem cells to
patients (also discussed in the response
from Geron authors, Wirth et al., 2011).
Second, we draw attention to some of
the unresolvable ethical and epistemolog-
ical challenges underlying any type of
translational research involving human
beings (Kimmelman and London, 2011;
Perkel, 2011). This tragic dimension of all
phase-I human trials is impossible to
unroot and is reflected in the running title
of our discussion (Solbakk, 2010).
Bretzner et al.’s Critique of Geron’s
Trial
The critical focus of Bretzner et al. (2011)’s
discussion is not the use of human embry-
onic stem cells per se, but the enrollment
in a phase-I study of a group of patients
deemed, in their eyes, as particularly
vulnerable. Indeed, the arguments raised
by Bretzner et al. (2011) are used to
support their objection to the trial’s enroll-
ment of patients diagnosedwith subacute
complete spinal cord injury (SCI); notably,
the same patient population predicted to
be among the eventual recipients of the
putative therapy under investigation.Given that the authors do not question
the justifiability of conducting phase-I
trials with patients as participants, we
presume that they acquiesce with the
epistemological and ethical preconditions
on which translational research involving
human beings is based:
d that the questions posed cannot be
answered by restricting the search
to in vitro and in vivo experiments
using animals or even nonhuman
primates, or cells thereof, or to
in vitro studies employing human
embryonic stem cells, and
d that the protocol is essentially
designed in a way to maximize ‘‘its
yield of knowledge,’’ while at the
same time minimizing the risks and
uncertainties to which enrolled
participants will be exposed (Kim-
melman et al., 2006).
It is important to keep in mind that in
translational research, uncertainty is not
restricted to risk; i.e, to quantifiable forms
of uncertainty: Nonquantifiable forms of
uncertainty, as well as genuine ignorance,
have to be taken into consideration as
well. Consequently, it is important to
distinguish between:
d risk; i.e., uncertainty conceived of
‘‘as quantitative probabilities in
a known sample space,’’
d strict uncertainty; i.e., uncertainty
where the sample space is known,
but probabilities of events cannot
be quantified, and
d ignorance; i.e., uncertainty where
the sample space is not fully known
(Rørtveit and Strand, 2001).Cell Stem CThe authors’ main concern seems to be
that the particular group of patients Geron
has enrolled is exposed to the additional
risk of losing the potential benefit of spon-
taneous recovery (Bretzner et al., 2011).
However, as Wirth et al. (2011) discuss
in their Forum article in this issue, in order
to be eligible for the trial, which is
designed to assess the safety and tolera-
bility of GRNOPC1, prospective patients
are assessed on multiple occasions
according to the ASIA (American Spinal
Injury Association) Impairment Scale
(AIS). Specifically, the authors state that
the ‘‘Geron clinical protocol includes
several preinjection International Stan-
dards for Neurological Classification of
Spinal Cord Injury (ISNCSCI) exams to
ensure, to the extent feasible, that all
participants are neurologically complete
at the time of GRNOPC1 injection’’ (Wirth
et al., 2011). Furthermore, AIS patients
with injuries assessed at grade A have
only the smallest chance of recovery,
and that is the reason the Geron study
targets this group. ‘‘The ASIA Impairment
Scale follows the Frankel scale, but differs
from the older scale in several important
respects. First, instead of no function
below the injury level, ASIA A is defined
as a person with no motor or sensory
function preserved in the sacral segments
S4-S5. This definition is clear and unam-
biguous.’’ (http://www.asia-spinalinjury.
org, accessed on April 19, 2011).
Bretzner et al. (2011) also question the
appropriateness of selecting this group
as trial participants due to the relatively
short time that has passed since the
patients in question have suffered their
cataclysm: ‘‘Seven to 14 days postinjury,ell 8, May 6, 2011 ª2011 Elsevier Inc. 479
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Geron trial, is a time during which the
patients who will have suffered an acute
traumatic event will be experiencing
stress, anxiety, fear, and depression in
degrees proportionate to the severity of
injury’’ (Bretzner et al., 2011). For this
reason, the authors draw the conclusion
that this group of patients is particularly
susceptible to the trap of therapeutic
misconception. In addition, they make
the claim that these patients will, almost
by definition, not understand the invitation
to enroll in a way that is in compliancewith
proper informed consent requirements
and with the principle of nonexploitation.
Critique of Bretzner et al.’s Critique
The points raised by Bretzner et al. (2011)
are interesting and potentially relevant
claims, but they suffer from insufficient
substantiation. First, the contention that
the enrollment of this group of patients
might jeopardize the possibility of sponta-
neous functional improvement among a
subgroup of these patients is not sup-
ported by any reference to relevant scien-
tific studies. The only reference provided
addresses challenges related to extend-
ing the basic ethical and epistemological
requirement in phase III-trials—so-called
‘‘clinical equipoise’’—to phase-I human
trials in general, and can hardly be said
to support the claim that this particular
group of participants will be worse off
than any other patient group (Anderson
and Kimmelman, 2010). Many clinical
trials, because of their very nature, must
be conducted with groups of patients
whobearnewlydiagnosed illnessor injury.
All clinical trials in neonatal care, or emer-
gency medicine, for example, face this
same complex set of negotiations.
Similarly, the authors’ contention that
this particular group of patients will be
more susceptible to the trapof therapeutic
misconception, and thereby to exploita-
tion, than the alternative groups of
patients they themselves propose comes
out as rather speculative. So is the theory
that targeting patients in the acute phase
of their diagnosis renders adult subjects,
however despairing they may be, inca-
pable of making difficult and complex
decisions about the moral choices they
must confront. Certainly, such patients
must already make decisions about their
situation and their response from the
moment they are conscious after their480 Cell Stem Cell 8, May 6, 2011 ª2011 Elsaccident. In fact, a core admonition of
bioethicists is to support maximal autono-
mous decision-making in patients. More-
over, it is unclear why duration of disease
makes a patient less vulnerable, or less
subject to inappropriate hope.
Even less supportable is Bretzner et al.
(2011)’s claim that chronic complete SCI
patients represent a less-vulnerable
group to target in this particular context.
This groupwould under no circumstances
benefit from such an enrollment, since the
entire premise of the trial in question is
based on the medical reality that the glial
scar that forms across the spinal cord
makes it highly unlikely that neuronal
stem cells could restore function. In fact,
by suggesting that chronic complete SCI
patients are more suitable for testing
safety, the authors indirectly acknowl-
edge that it is, ethically speaking, more
justifiable in a research context to use
a group of patients merely as a means of
generating scientific knowledge (here:
safety) that will be of no relevance what-
soever to the trial subjects themselves,
than to use an alternative group of
patients for acquiring knowledge about
safety, while at the same time at least
not excluding the possibility that some
kind of functional benefit might also take
place. The FDA’s approval of the Geron
trial as a phase-I clinical trial was partly
based on the fact that besides assessing
safety, an additional endpoint was to
look for evidence of change in function
(see www.clinicaltrials.gov, trial identifier
NCT01217008, accessed April 19, 2011).
For this reason, the enrolled patients will
be followed for 15 years to track both
change and durability of change in func-
tion, in addition to long-term safety.
Notably, in spite of their concerns about
subacute SCI patients being more
susceptible to the trap of therapeutic
misconception and of exploitation than
chronic SCI patients, Bretzner et al.
(2011) proceed to suggest that subacute
incomplete SCI patients should be
preferred over subacute complete SCI
patients in efficacy tests. This position
invalidates their initial argument about
‘‘subacuteness’’ not being in compliance
with proper informed consent require-
ments and with the principle of
nonexploitation.
Furthermore, the list of potential
adverse effects that the authors use to
argue against the trial enrollment of acuteevier Inc.chronic SCI patients is as relevant for any
other patient group, including the three
groups that they themselves suggest—
chronic complete SCI patients, subacute
incomplete SCI patients, and multiple
sclerosis (MS) patients. Of particular
concern is the suggestion that first-use
trials should take place in patients with
chronic, deteriorating MS—a condition
for which the animal models are limited
(Mathews et al., 2008), and for which no
FDA documentation has been filed.
The Tragedy of Translation
Finally, Anderson and Kimmelman’s
observation that, so far, ‘‘no widely
accepted standards for judgments of
risk, benefit, and value in Phase I trials’’
have seen the day (Anderson andKimmel-
man, 2010), draws attention to an under-
lying tragic dimension of translational
research from which there is no resolution
in terms of compromise ormediation. That
is, it can certainly be viewed as tragic
that, in order to eventually translate
basic research into clinical applications,
patients must be enrolled into an interim
study phase designed not to offer benefit,
but to obtain knowledge about safety.
Although this step, hopefully, in its turn,
will make a clinical trial in compliance
with the basic epistemological and ethical
requirement of therapeutic trials (i.e.,
clinical equipoise) possible, it is our
contention that no widely accepted
standards for judgments of risk, benefit,
and value in phase-1 trials in compliance
with this basic requirement will become
reality. This failure, we believe, relates to
the fact that phase-I trials will always
contain a tragic dimension from which
there is no ethically neat or risk-free
course. That is, bringing basic research
into clinical application cannot bypass
the phase-I study step, at least not in
jurisdictionswith rigorouspolicy formation
and enforcement. Such is the nature of
resolution in relation to the complex chal-
lenges raised by phase-I trials involving
patients; when the work is done, moral
doubt and epistemological ambiguity will
still remain (Solbakk, 2010). Our conten-
tion is that there are no standards whatso-
ever that will be able to fully resolve these
enigmas. Research on humans will inevi-
tably have an existential moment at which
it must be begun, and taking this step will
always require deep courage and serious
altruism on the part of those individuals
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whom researchers cannot fully rescue
from their fragility as patients in crisis,
and patients for whom the choice to
participate or not can represent an impor-
tant moral option. Nothing that a critic can
say, and no set of regulations can change
this fundamental reality and instrumen-
tality of all translational research. It is
simply unavoidable that the abrupt, stark
negative change to one’s condition is an
inherent component of the severe trauma
or sudden illness that is the setting for
much of this research. A set of patients
for whom hope is completely impossible,
knowledge is rationally organized, and all
risks fully understood has simply never
been found—and a quixotic search for
them will only postpone the time when
the full duty of research must be con-
fronted and the actual population of
persons for whom the intervention might
offer respite must be tested. This require-
ment seems especially necessary in this
case, given that a 15-year follow-up is
part of the research design.
Criteria for determining themost appro-
priate first human use for translational
research will be an ongoing discussion,
and in the case of stem cell research, so
wrapped in competing political and reli-
gious appeals, so yearned for and so
long promised, patient selection and
research design must be a matter of
robust discourse. We suggest that this
discourse needs two caveats. First,
bioethicists are ‘‘strangers at thebedside’’
(Rothman, 1999) and thus should not be
the people who design the science. This
error marked the early debates in the field
in which nonscientists suggested experi-
mental approaches to ‘‘create morally
acceptable embryos’’ in the lab, which
were not actually possible to make scien-
tifically (Hurlbut, 2007). In our estimation,Bretzner et al. (2011) fall prey to this
same error by suggesting the use of
‘‘morally acceptable,’’ but not medically
necessary, groups of patients for the initial
safety trial of GRNOPC1 cells. Second,
the language of virtues needed to confront
the tragedies of translation needs to
include a call for the long and patient
commitment to structure support for
participants in clinical trials. We suggest
a principle of fidelity (Zoloth, 2010) in
which researchers make moral promises
to not only remain in contact with
subjects, but promise to ‘‘stand with’’
subjects over time and throughout
changing conditions of illness. Will the
research yield either short-term or durable
benefit, however small? Will the research
cause terrible harm, or even moderate
increase in human suffering now or in the
future? We cannot say, and we cannot
design a way to know without asking and
risking. We can, however, insist that this
is a social relationship in which the inves-
tigators and the watching public have
a duty towitness and respond towhatever
need may arise. Furthermore, the risk of
failure must not be borne by patients
alone, but shared as much as possible
by the investigators who also stand to
gain in light of clinical success. In calling
for fidelity, we expand our moral universe
beyond the moment of instrumental use,
and raise the issue of the enduring rela-
tionship between subjects, researchers,
and society that has long been an
unspoken part of the research enterprise.
Consequently, we find that in the
interim phase between basic research
and applied therapy, we are left with
a complex mixture of scientific ambition,
different forms of uncertainty (risk, strict
uncertainty, ignorance, and benefit), and
fallibility. The challenge, therefore, is not
to stop, but to describe the inherentCell Stem Cpitfalls of translation in a way that is in
compliance with the principles of trans-
parency, accountability, and minimization
of harm to implicated patients, and to
stand together, shoulder to shoulder,
throughout the journey in order to finally
witness and enjoy the culmination of the
medical potential that stem cells have
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